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I.

Introduction

A.

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C.
§ 181, et seq., the basic statute authorizing
mineral leasing on the public lands, does not
specifically address environmental pro
tection.

The only reference arguably dealing

with environmental protection is found in
Section 30 of the Act, which provides that
the Secretary shall require certain provi
sions in each lease, including "provisions
for the purpose of insuring the exercise of
reasonable diligence, skill, and care in the
operation of said property; a provision... for
the prevention of undue waste...and such
other provisions as he may deem neces
sary... for the protection of the interests of
the United States,...and for the safeguarding
of the public welfare...."
1.

30 U.S.C.

§ 187.

The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments of
1976 amended the Mineral Leasing Act
provisions concerning the issuance of
coal leases, and require the Secretary
to consider the environmental impacts of
issuing a coal lease.

30 U.S.C.

§ 201(a)(3)(C).
B.

Environmental laws passed mainly in the
1970's (e.g., the Clean Water Act, Clean Air

Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act;
Endangered Species Act, etc.) apply to op
erations on mineral leases.

Beyond requiring

compliance with those laws, the Secretary's
power to manage lease operations (for exam
ple , to preserve subjective scenic values) is
determined largely by the terms of the lease
contracts,

including "stipulations" attached

to them, and his regulations in effect when
the leases were issued.

It has long been

held that when the United States "comes down
from its position of sovereignty and enters
the domain of commerce,

it submits itself to

the same laws that govern individuals there."
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S.

389 (1875).

This means that in determining the respective
rights of the Secretary and mineral lessees,
the courts will look to general contract law
principles.

See Rosebud Coal Sales Co. V.

Andrus, 667 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1982)
(involving interpretation of federal coal
lease).
C.

The lease terms typically included in federal
mineral leases, as well as the Secretary's
regulations, give the Secretary broad power
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to regulate mineral operations on tlie leases
in order to protect the environment.

The

lease form and regulations for oil and gas
leases illustrate this.
The federal oil and gas lease form now in ef
fect provides that the "rights granted are
subject to applicable laws, the terms, condi
tions, and attached stipulations of this
lease, the Secretary of the Interior's regu
lations and formal orders in effect as of
lease issuance, and to regulations and formal
orders hereafter promulgated when not incon
sistent with lease rights granted or specific
provisions of this lease."
March 1984).

(Form 3100-11,

The lease form also contains

the following clause concerning the conduct
of operations:
"Sec. 6. Conduct of operations— Lessee shall
conduct operations in a manner that minimizes
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water,
to cultural, biological, visual, and other
resources, and to other land uses or users.
Lessee shall take reasonable measures deemed
necessary by lessor to accomplish the intent
of this section.
To the extent consistent
with lease rights granted, such measures may
include, but are not limited to, modification
to siting or design of facilities, timing of
operations, and specification of interim and
final reclamation measures.
Lessor reserves
the right to continue existing uses and to
authorize further uses upon or in the leased
lands, including the approval of easements of
rights-of-ways.
Such uses shall be
-3-

conditioned so as to prevent unnecessary or
unreasonable interference with rights of lesS 00 •

Prior to disturbing the surface of the leased
lands, lessee shall contact lessor to be ap
prised of procedures to be followed and modi
fications or reclamation measures that may be
necessary.
Areas to be disturbed may require
inventories or special studies to determine
the extent of impacts to other resources.
Lessee may be required to complete minor in
ventories or short term special studies under
guidelines provided by lessor.
If in the
conduct of operations, threatened or endan
gered species, objects of historic or scien
tific interest, or substantial unanticipated
environmental effects are observed, lessee
shall immediately contact lessor.
Lessee
shall cease any operations that would result
in the destruction of such species or ob
jects ."
E.

The Secretary's regulations governing oil and
gas operations provide that "the lessee shall
conduct operations in a manner which protects
the mineral resources, other natural re
sources and environmental quality."
C.F.R.

§ 3162.5-l(a)

(1984).

43

Furthermore,

"the lessee shall exercise due care and dili
gence to assure that leasehold operations do
not result in undue damage to surface or
subsurface resources or surface improve
ments."
F.

43 C.F.R.

§ 3162.5-1(b) (1984).

Despite this broad power to mitigate environ
mental impacts from mineral lease operations,
environmental groups frequently object to the
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issuance of mineral leases or, alternatively,
argue that the Secretary should attach a
stipulation to the lease reserving the power
to prohibit operations if he later decides
that the environmental impacts are
unacceptable.

While recognizing the Secre

tary's broad power to mitigate environmental
impacts by regulating the manner, method,
timing and location of lease operations, the
courts have held that in the absence of spe
cific power to deny development, the lease
gives the lessee the right to explore for and
develop the minerals on a lease.

See Sierra

Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Union Oil Company of California v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975); Sun Oil
Company v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct.
Cl. 1978).
II.

The Consideration of Environmental Protection at
the Lease Issuance Stage
A.

Discretion to lease
1.

The Mineral Leasing Act gives the Secre
tary discretion to decide not to issue a
lease at all.
U.S. 1 (1965).

See Udall v. Tallman, 380
Thus, if the Secretary

concludes that the environmental
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consequences of mineral activities on a
proposed lease would be unacceptable, he
can simply not issue a lease.
2.

An exception to this rule applies to the
issuance of "preference right coal
leases" to holders of prospecting per
mits issued prior to the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments of 1976.

Such leases

cannot be rejected for environmental
reasons.

NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553

(D.C. Cir. 1979).

The 1976 amendments

eliminated the prospecting permit/preference right coal lease system.
B.

Limitations on Secretary's discretion
1.

The Mineral Leasing Act does not place
any restrictions on the Secretary's dis
cretion to lease or not to lease.

How

ever, Congress has placed various re
strictions on his discretion in other
statutes.

These restrictions relate

primarily to leasing in wilderness and
wilderness candidate areas.
2.

As of January 1, 1984, new leasing was
barred in designated wilderness areas by
the Wilderness Act of 1964,
$ 1133(d)(3).

-6-

16 U.S.C.

3.

New leasing is currently prohibited in
four types of wilderness candidate areas
RARE II areas recommended for wilder
ness designation, RARE II further plan
ning areas, BLM wilderness study areas
and Congressionally designated wilder
ness study areas —

by a "rider" at

tached to the Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
for fiscal year 1985.

Pub. L. No.

98-473, Section 308, 98 Stat. 1871.
This leasing ban expires on October 1,
1985, but there is no indication that it
will be lifted for fiscal year 1986.
The ban has been in effect since October
1982.
Comment:

Congress's increasing use of

appropriation measures as vehicles to
amend substantive legislation has been
criticized.

Among other things, the ap

propriations committees generally do not
have the experience or expertise in nat
ural resource and environmental matters
that the substantive committees have.
The Senate and House rules also
-7-

discourage,

if not prohibit, attaching

substantive legislation to appropriation
acts.

Yet the courts have generally en

forced such measures, although "an
amendment will not readily be inferred"
and the intent of Congress to effect
such a change "must be clearly mani
fest."

New York Airways,

Inc, v. United

States, 369 F.2d 743, 749 (Ct. Cl.
1966).
4.

The National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") requires the Secretary to con
sider the environmental impacts of
issuing mineral leases.
§ 4332.

42 U.S.C.

If the impacts are "signifi

cant," the Secretary is required to pre
pare an environmental impact statement.
42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C ).

However, NEPA

does not place any substantive con
straints on the Secretary's discretion
to issue mineral leases.

See Strycker's

Bay Neighborhood Council,

Inc, v.

Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. V.
N RDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
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5.

The Interior Board of Land Appeals,
which issues final decisions for the
Secretary, has held that the Bureau of
Land Management (which administers the
leasing program for the Secretary) can
not reject a lease unless (1) it has
considered leasing with restrictive
stipulations to protect the environment
(Robert G. Lynn, 76 IBLA 383) and (2)
the record supports BLM1s conclusion
that the public interest would be served
by rejection of the lease application
(Eagle Exploration Co., 69 IBLA 96).

6.

Another limitation on the Secretary's
authority to decide not to issue leases
is that, depending on the circumstances,
such a decision may amount to a with
drawal of public land which must be re
ported to Congress under the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act
("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C.

§ 1714(c).

In

Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980),
the court found that the Secretary's in
action for several years on oil and gas
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lease applications in areas of Wyoming,
Idaho and Montana because of the RARE I
and II wilderness studies constituted a
withdrawal that had to be reported to
Congress.
C.

Issuance of leases with environmentally pro
tective stipulations
1.

In recent years, the Secretary has been
attaching various stipulations when
issuing new leases, particularly in en
vironmentally sensitive areas.

The Sec

retary's objective is to inform the les
see of potential restrictions on his
normal lease development rights, and to
retain the contractual authority to con
trol environmental impacts.

In addi

tion, as noted above, the Board of Land
Appeals has held that a lease should not
be rejected if stipulations will ade
quately protect the environment.
2.

Certain of these stipulations are now
standard, e .g ., the Department of the
Interior's "surface disturbance" stipu
lation (form 3109-5), the stipulation
for lands under jurisdiction of the
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Department of Agriculture (form 3109-3)
and the Forest Service Supplement to
form 3109-3.

Others are classified as

"special" stipulations, and they include
a wildlife protection stipulation, a
"cultural resource" protection stipula
tion, a "Jackson Hole Area oil and gas"
stipulation, a "coordinated exploration"
stipulation, a "wilderness protection"
stipulation for BLM wilderness study
areas (see 44 Fed. Reg. 72031 (Dec. 12,
1979)), a "further planning area" stipu
lation for RARE II further planning
areas, a "conditional no surface occu
pancy" stipulation and a "contingent
right" stipulation (see 47 Fed. Reg♦
18158 (April 28, 1982)).

For the most

part, these stipulations condition
drilling and development operations on
obtaining prior approval from the Secre
tary.

However, whether the Secretary

has the power actually to deny approval
of the necessary permit or to place con
ditions on development that would make
operations uneconomical is seldom
spelled out.
-11-

3.

In Sierra Club v. Peterson,

1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

717 F.2d

(Attachment A),

the court interpreted the Secretary's
power under several of these stipula
tions.

In that case, BLM and the Forest

Service had attached the standard sur
face disturbance stipulations (forms
3109-3,

3109-5, and 3109-3 Supp.), the

further planning area stipulation, the
coordinated exploration stipulation, the
Jackson Hole Area stipulation and the
conditional no surface occupancy stipu
lation to all or part of leases in a
RARE II further planning area.

The

court found that only the conditional no
surface occupancy (NSO) stipulation au
thorizes the Secretary to preclude ex
ploration or development on the leases.
The other stipulations merely authorize
the Secretary to mitigate the impacts of
the operations by regulating the loca
tion of well-sites, construction of ac
cess roads etc., and do not take away
the lessee's right to develop.

A copy

of the NSO stipulation at issue in
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Sierra Club v . Peterson is Attachment B.

A copy of the "contingent right" stipu
lation, which was not involved in Sierra
Club v. Peterson, but which is a clearer
statement of the Secretary's attempt to
reserve the contractual authority to
prohibit development, is Attachment C.
4.

The Secretary's statutory power to im
pose a stipulation reserving authority
to prohibit development anywhere on a
lease was not squarely in issue in
Sierra Club v. Peterson, and has not
been tested in the courts.

It could be

argued that the Mineral Leasing Act does
not authorize the Secretary to so condi
tion a lease.

For example, in other

statutes Congress has specifically given
the Secretary the power to prohibit de
velopment for environmental reasons.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (dealing with off
shore oil and gas leases) and 30 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)

(dealing with coal exploration

licenses).

It has not done so for

onshore oil and gas and other mineral
leases.

In this regard, the Wilderness
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Act of 1964 merely provides that mineral
leases issued in designated wilderness
areas shall contain "reasonable stipula
tions ... for the protection of the wil
derness character of the land consistent
with the use of the land for the purpos
es for which they were leased...." 16
U.S.C.

§ 1133(d)(3)

(emphasis added).

Ill. NEPA Developments Concerning Issuance of Onshore
Oil and Gas Leases
A.

NEPA requires an environmental impact state
ment (EIS) for any major federal action "sig
nificantly affecting the quality of the human
environment...." 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(c).

Since NEPA was enacted in 1970, only one EIS
has been prepared for the issuance of onshore
oil and gas leases.

That EIS was for leasing

in the Washakie Wilderness Area of Wyoming.
Interior and the Forest Service (where Na
tional Forest lands are involved) more typi
cally prepare "environmental assessments" of
leasing and conclude that an EIS is not re
quired because the impacts will not be sig
nificant.

Where multiple-use public lands

are involved that have no potential for con
sideration as wilderness,
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Interior often

relies on a "categorical exclusion" from en
vironmental review in its NEPA implementing
regulations and does not prepare even an en
vironmental assessment.

This categorical ex

clusion provides that except in certain
specified unusual circumstances, neither an
EIS nor an EA is necessary for the "issuance
of individual non-competitive upland oil and
gas leases."

46 Fed Reg. 7492, 7495 (Jan.

23, 1981).
B.

In Sierra Club v. Peterson, supra, 717 F.2d
at 1409, the Sierra Club appealed the issu
ance of oil and gas leases in the "Palisades"
area of Idaho and Wyoming, a RARE II further
planning area.

The Forest Service had pre

pared an environmental assessment and made a
finding of no significant impact.

As noted

above, the leases were issued subject to nu
merous stipulations.

In particular, the con

ditional no surface occupancy (NSO) stipula
tion was attached to all areas that the
Forest Service determined were "highly envi
ronmentally sensitive," about 80 per cent of
the area.

Leases on the remaining 20 per

cent were issued subject to other
-15-

stipulations, but not the NSO stipulation.
The Sierra Club contended that an EIS was re
quired for the leases issued without NSO
stipulations.

Finding that such leases

granted lessees the right to explore for and
develop oil and gas, and that the impacts of
such activities in the Palisades could be
"significant" under NEPA, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Secretary ei
ther had to prepare an EIS or reserve the au
thority to prohibit activities that would
cause unacceptable impacts to the environment
by appropriate stipulations.

On remand to

the district court, the NSO stipulation was
attached to the leases.
C.

There has been some question as to the appli
cation of Sierra Club v. Peterson

(also known

as the "Palisades" decision) beyond the facts
of that case.

In that case, the lands were

under study for wilderness, and the terrain
was mountainous.

Furthermore, the environ

mental assessment was expressly limited to
exploration only and incorrectly assumed that
leasing was in effect a paper transaction
which would not result in any "physical or
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biological impacts."

717 F .2d at 1413.

Thus, the court concluded that the finding of
no significant impact "is not supportable on
this record."

Id. (emphasis added).

The

Palisades decision does not appear, there
fore, to establish a per se rule that the is
suance of oil and gas leases anywhere on pub
lic lands requires an EIS or NSO stipulation.
D.

In environmentally sensitive or wilderness
areas, however, the Palisades decision may
lead to greater reliance by the Secretary on
NSO or contingent right stipulations.

The

Secretary is reluctant to prepare costly and
time-consuming EIS's for onshore oil and gas
leases because, historically^ drilling occurs
on only one in ten of these leases.
E.

Possible advantages of using lease stipula
tions to postpone detailed NEPA review
1.

Very few leases reach the drilling stage
and; where drilling occurs, it usually
affects only a small portion of the
lease area (about 4 acres).

If the Sec

retary can postpone the environmentalanalysis until a site-specific drilling
proposal is submitted, he can avoid
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attempting to analyze the impacts of es
sentially hypothetical activities on an
unknown location, and thus save time and
money.
2.

Oil and gas lessees obviously prefer
leases with development rights, and some
companies will refuse to accept a lease
with stipulations in effect taking away
development rights.

However,

in some

cases a lessee may prefer to have a
lease without development rights rather
than wait for an EIS to be prepared.
For example, the lessee might need the
lease not for drilling purposes but to
complete a "lease block," i .e ., a large
area under lease.

Where there are gaps

in a potential lease block,

it is usu

ally not prudent to drill a well because
the drilling, which can be extremely ex
pensive in areas such as the Overthrust
Belt in the Rocky Mountains (in excess
of $10 million for one well), might only
establish the location of oil and gas
for the benefit of a competitor.
an oil and gas field can often be
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Since

drained without drilling on every lease,
a lease without development rights might
be adequate to protect the lessee1s in
vestment in drilling the well on a dif
ferent lease.
F.

There are, however, some practical problems
resulting from the use of such stipulations.
Depending on how widespread the use of these
stipulations becomes, it could reduce explor
atory drilling and the discovery of new do
mestic oil reserves.
1.

Where the stipulations are accepted, the
lessee is taking a risk that the Secre
tary may not allow drilling to occur
after preparation of the appropriate en
vironmental analysis.

Under what cir

cumstances will the Secretary allow
drilling?

There are no real guidelines

to apply.

Until there is some experi

ence with the administration of these
stipulations, it is difficult to gauge
the extent of the lessee's risk in ac
cepting the stipulations.

Consequently,

industry will face uncertainties in de
termining whether to acquire such leases
-19-

and; if so, at what price.

And despite

the risk of not being able to drill, the
lessee must make annual rental payments
to the Secretary to maintain the lease.
2.

There are various forms of pre-drilling
seismic exploration work that sometimes
require large expenditures of money.
This is particularly true in the
Overthrust Belt, where the geology is
extemely complex.

In many cases, indus

try simply cannot commit the funds nec
essary for such exploration until leases
with development rights have been ob
tained.

Furthermore, where a number of

leases in a lease block are subject to
NSO or contingent right stipulations,
the risk of not being able to extract
the oil and gas may discourage explor
atory drilling.
G.

If exploration or development is denied,
should the lessee be entitled to compensa
tion?

The question has not yet arisen.

the one hand,

On

it could be argued that the

lessee accepted the leases with knowledge of
the risk that development might be denied,
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and is therefore not entitled to compensa
tion.

On the other hand, the Outer Continen

tal Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1331 et

seq♦/ which specifically authorizes the Sec
retary to preclude operations for environ
mental reasons, provides for payment of com
pensation to the lessee if exploration or
development is denied.
H.

43 U.S.C.

§ 1334(a).

A Montana federal district court recently
held that several hundred oil and gas leases
in the Flathead and Gallatin National Forests
in Montana were issued in violation of NEPA
because an EIS was not prepared.

Conner v.

Burford, No. CV-82-42-BU (D. Mont. March 8,
1985)

(Attachment D ) .

Although the facts of

the case are not entirely clear from the
court's opinion, it appears that some of the
leases had been issued with NSO stipulations;
others had not been.

With respect to the

leases without NSO stipulations, the court
merely stated that Sierra Club v. Peterson
requires an EIS.

The court did not discuss

the quality of the environmental assessment,
the reasonableness of the agencies1 finding
of no significant impact, or the character of
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the land involved.

(The court referred to

the area as "potential wilderness" in its
opinion, but all of the Flathead and parts of
the Gallatin National Forest were allocated
to nonwilderness during the Forest Service's
RARE II program.)

With respect to the leases

with NSO stipulations, the court disregarded
Sierra Club v. Peterson and held that an EIS
was required for those leases as well.

The

court did not discuss the D.C. Circuit's con
clusion that under the NSO stipulation the
Secretary can prohibit operations and thus no
commitment has been made.
1.

The extent to which the court's opinion
affects the issued leases is not clear
because none of the lessees were ever
joined as defendants in the case.

Fed

eral oil and gas lessees are generally
indispensable parties to any suit that
would adversely affect their rights
under the leases.

See, e .g ., Naartex

Consulting Corp. v. W a t t , 722 F.2d 779
(D.C. C i r . 1983), cert denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2399 (1984).
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IV.

Environmental Considerations After Leases are Is
sued
A.

Lessees must obtain a permit from the Secre
tary before they can conduct any surface dis
turbing activities on the leases.
C.F.R.

§ 3162.3-1.

See 43

If the proposed activity

would "significantly" affect the environment,
an EIS must be prepared.

42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C ).
B.

The Secretary has the power to impose certain
mitigation measures on operations after
leases are issued.

However, as noted above,

in the absence of a stipulation giving him
the power to do so, he cannot impose require
ments so stringent as to take away the devel
opment rights granted by the lease.

The Sec

retary is bound by the lease contract just as
any other private party is bound by a con
tract. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571, 580 (1934).
C.

An example of new conditions imposed after
mineral leases have been issued is Copper
Valley Machine Works, Inc v. Andrus, 653 F.2d
595 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

In that case, the Sec

retary attached a condition to a drilling
permit allowing drilling during the winter
-23-

season only.

While recognizing the Secre

tary's power to impose such a time limita
tion, the court also held that the lessee was
entitled to an extension of its lease for the
length of time drilling operations were pro
hibited .
D.

Preparation of environmental analyses under
NEPA for drilling permit applications obvi
ously takes time, in some cases several
years.

Recognizing that it would be unfair

to force the lessee to pay rentals and to
continue the clock running on the lease term
during this period, the Secretary has sus
pended leases during the environmental review
period under Section 39 of the Mineral Leas
ing Act, 30 U.S.C.

§ 209.

Suspending the

lease term enables the Secretary to prepare
the required environmental analysis while
also giving the lessee the full benefit of
his lease, as the court in Copper Valley held
he was entitled to.
E.

In granting suspensions, the Secretary gener
ally includes language providing for the ter
mination of the suspension if certain events
occur.

A pending case involves the
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interpretation of language concerning the
termination of a suspension, and the authori
ty of the Secretary to take away development
rights after a lease has been issued without
such a condition.

In Sierra Club et al., 80

IBLA 251, 264 (May 2, 1984), the Board of
Land Appeals determined that the following
language in the lease suspension created au
thority to prohibit all drilling activity
(which therefore required full consideration
of the no-action alternative in the EIS pre
pared for the drilling permit):
Suspensions are for an indefinite period of
time, subject to automatic termination on the
first of the month in which (1) the lessees
and unit operator are notified in writing of
the decision not to approve any oil and gas
drilling operations within the Bear Thrust
Unit area on the basis of its determination
that such operations would result in
unacceptable impacts on the wilderness char
acteristics of the area, or (2) actual ap
proved drilling operations are commenced
should it be decided to permit the drilling
of the well.
The Board held that the Secretary had author
ity to alter the lessee's development rights
because delays caused by the lessee rather
than the government necessitated the suspen
sion.

Id.

The lessee has challenged the

Board's decision on the grounds that (1) the
-25-

Secretary did not intend to reserve authority
to prohibit all drilling activity;

(2) the

Secretary lacks authority under the Mineral
Leasing Act to deprive the lessee of develop
ment rights by means of a lease suspension;
and (3) the IBLA erred in concluding that the
lessee's conduct necessitated the lease sus
pension.
84-432

Getty Oil Company v. Clark, No.

(D. Wyo.).

The case is pending on

cross motions for summary judgment.
V.

Impact Of Environmental Protection Measures on
Valid Existing Rights
A.

Congress has generally grandfathered "valid
existing rights" in implementing new regula
tory programs.

For example, the Wilderness

Act of 1964 prohibition of any "commercial
enterprise" within the National Wilderness
Preservation System is made "subject to ex
isting private rights."
Similarly,

16 U.S.C.

§ 1133(c).

all of the provisions of FLPMA re

pealing a host of public land statutes and
instituting a number of new programs,
including review of lands managed by the Bu
reau of Land Management for possible designa
tion as wilderness, are made subject to
"valid existing rights."

-26-

90 Stat. 2786, 43

U.S.C.

§ 1701 (note).

The objective has been

to negate any implication that Congress was
authorizing the federal agencies involved to
"take" private property rights in carrying
out the new programs.
B.

Congress has generally not attempted to de
fine the rights protected or to indicate the
extent to which such rights might be regu
lated, leaving both issues to the agencies
and courts.

One explanation lei. Cuuyicoa'o

iductance to address these issues is that
many private property rights are determined
by state law.

This is not the case, however,

for mineral leases on the public lands.
C.

What are valid existing rights?
1.

The Solicitor of the Department of Inte
rior issued an opinion in 1981 generally
discussing the nature of "valid existing
rights" protected under FLPMA.
90 (Attachment E).

88 I.D.

With respect to fed

eral mineral leases, he concluded that
oucu

i t a o c o

weie valid existing rights,

although the extent of the rights pro
tected would depend on the statute under
which the leases were issued, the terms
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of the lease contracts and the stipula
tions attached.
2.

Oil and gas leases are frequently in
conflict with wilderness, particularly
in the Overthrust Belt region of the
Rocky Mountains.

The Solicitor's opin

ion means that development on such
leases cannot be unreasonably restricted
or denied unless the leases are subject
to a stipulation giving the Secretary
the power to preclude development.

If

the Secretary wants to condemn the
leases, he must obtain the authority to
do so from Congress.
3.

The Interior Department's Office of Sur
face Mining has been struggling with the
definition of "valid existing rights”
under Section 522(e) of the Surface Min
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C.

§ 1272(e).

That

section prohibits surface coal mining
operations on specified categories of
lands, subject to "valid existing
rights."

O S M 's 1979 regulations defined

valid existing rights under this
provision to mean, in part:
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(a) except for haul roads, (1) Those
property rights in existence on August
3, 1977, that were created by a legally
binding conveyance, lease, deed, con
tract or other document which authorizes
the applicant to produce coal by a sur
face coal mining operation; and (2) The
person proposing to conduct surface coal
iiiining on such lands... (i) Had been val
idly issued, on or before August 3,
1977, all State and Federal permits nec
essary to conduct such operations on
those lands...
44 Fed. Reg. 15342 (1979); 30 C.F.R.
§ 761.5 (1980).

Judge Flannery struck

down this definition in 1980 because he
concluded that a good faith attempt to
obtain all permits before the August 3,
1977 cut off date should suffice for
meeting "all permits" test.

In re: Per

manent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga
tion I , 14 ERC 1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,
1980).

In 1981, the D.C. Circuit re

manded the appeals of the Flannery deci
sion for further consideration in light
of Secretary Watt's stated intent to
significantly revise the SMCRA regula
tions.

In 1983, OSM published a new

definition of valid existing rights
under Section 522 of SMCRA:
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Except for haul roads, that a person
possesses valid existing rights for an
area protected under section 522(e) of
the Act on August 3, 1977, if the appli
cation of any of the prohibitions
contained in that section to the proper
ty interest that existed on that date
would effect a taking of the person's
property which would entitled the person
to just compensation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
48 Fed. Reg. 41349 (1983);
§ 761.5 (1984).
challenged

30 C.F.R.

This new definition was

Giiv"I.j■onmental groups, and

Judge Flannery recently held that it was
promulgated without the required notice
and comment because it differed substan
tially from the new definition proposed
in 1982.

In re: Permanent Surface Min

ing Regulation Litigation II, 22 ERC
1557
D.

(D.D.C. March 22, 1985).

What is the extent of the valid existing
rights protection?
1.

The extent of the protection depends on
the statute and regulations in effect
when the lease was issued, and the terms
of the lease contract itself.

See So

licitor's valid existing rights opinion,
supra (Attachment E ) .
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2.

Even if a lease conveys certain valid
existing rights, it is still subject to
reasonable regulation by the Secretary.
In other words, exploration and develop
ment operations can be made more diffi
cult and more expensive in order to pro
tect the environment.

However, the

Secretary cannot go so far in his regu
lation as to make operations
unreasonably difficult or expensive, and
he obviously cannot deny operations al
together without obtaining condemnation
authority from Congress.

See Utah v.

Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1010 (D. Utah
1979)

(regulations may not "be so pro

hibitively restrictive as to render the
land incapable of full economic develop
ment” ) .
3.

Whether stringent regulation amounts to
a taking depends on the circumstances of
each case.

Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.

51, 65 (1979).
4.

In a recent decision involving the valid
existing rights provision of FLPMA, a
federal district court in California
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held that lands in which the minerals
were privately owned were not exempt
from the wilderness study program of
Section 603 of FLPMA.
Watt, No. S-83-035
1985).

Sierra Club v.

(E.D. Cal. April 18,

The Interior Board of Land Ap

peals had held that such "split estate"
lands could not be designated and man
aged as wilderness study areas because
"[t]he fee simple mineral estate owned
by appellant, and the attendant rights
to use the surface, are unquestionably
'immune from denial and extinguishment
by the exercise of secretarial discre
tion.'

To designate such lands as W S A 's

and to engage in formal studies of them
to ascertain whether they are suscepti
ble to management as a permanent part of
the wilderness system is to engage in
futile and pointless exercises with pre
ordained results, akin to commissioning
a study of water to determine if it is
dry."

Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 64

IBLA 27, 34 (1982).

In reaching a con

trary conclusion, the district court
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noted that the private mineral rights
were still protected during the wilder
ness study.

With respect to one mineral

owner's argument that placement in wil
derness study status reduces the market
value of its property, the court noted
that whether this effect would amount to
a taking of private rights without just
compensation is a question to be ad
dressed in another suit.

Slip op. at

70, n . 55.
5.

In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v.
Watt, 696 F .2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982), the
court held that the nonimpairment stan
dard for wilderness study areas desig
nated under Section 603 of FLPMA applies
to mineral leases issued before and
after the enactment of FLPMA.

However,

it pointed out that "[wjhether § 701(h)
[the valid existing rights provison]
saves a particular lease is an issue
that is not before us."

Id. at 746, n.

17.
E.

Need for Congressional direction
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1.

Congress needs to undertake a comprehen
sive review of the problems caused by
simply including boilerplate protection
of valid existing rights in broad regu
latory or preservationist legislation
and dropping the tough problems in the
laps of federal and state agencies and
the courts.

However, that effort seems

unlikely to occur.

Indeed, Congress

continued its usual practice in the last
Congress in connection with many of the
statewide wilderness statutes it en
acted.

For example, yielding to pres

sure from wilderness organizations, Con
gress added a controversial area in
Wyoming to the National Wilderness Pres
ervation System even though it was sub
ject to oil and gas leases on which an
application for permit to drill

(and

litigation challenging the approval of
the permit) was pending.

Congress made

a special effort to protect such rights
as the affected lessees might be able to
establish by providing specific pro
tection for such rights in addition to
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the basic language in the Wilderness Act
of 1964 to which all wilderness areas
are subject.

Thus, it created the Gros

Ventre Wilderness area in Wyoming "sub
ject to valid existing rights and reasonable access to exercise such rights"
(98 Stat. 2808, emphasis added).

How

the courts will view that effort remains
to be seen.
2.

In the wilderness designation context,
one solution might be to create a spe
cial management category providing for
environmental protection but allowing
mineral development to proceed.

For ex

ample, in the Wyoming Wilderness Act
Congress designated the portion of the
Palisades Further Planning Area in
Wyoming as a "wilderness study area."
However, because of existing oil and gas
leases and the high oil and gas poten
tial of the area, Congress provided that
oil and gas exploration and development
in the Palisades "shall be administered
under reasonable conditions to protect
the environment according to the laws
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and regulations generally applicable to
nonwllderness lands within the National
Forest System."

Pub. L. No. 98-550,

Section 301(C)(1)) 98 Stat. 2811 (empha
sis added)

(Attachment F ) .

Activities

Other than oil and gas exploration and
development in the Palisades are subject
to wilderness management guidelines,
a.

Congress has generally resisted
creation of "third tier" management
categories) preferring instead to
designate lands as either
nonwilderness or wilderness.

How

ever) the conflicts which exist be
tween mineral development and wil
derness preservation are not easily
resolved by adhering to a rigid
either/or classification system.
When Congress addresses statewide
RARE II wilderness bills for Idaho
and Montana) there may be an effort
to deal with resource conflicts by
creating special management
categories similar to the Palisades
Wilderness Study Area in Wyoming.
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dence in his possession and declined the
agency’s request to produce it. To make
SIERRA CLUB, Appellant,
the agency investigate further is one thing;
v.
but to make it duplicate evidence which the
employee already possesses (and which, but R. Max PETERSON, in his official capaci
for his negligent failure to obtain permis
ty as Chief Forester of the United
sion, if that is to be believed, he could turn
States Forest Service, Department of
over to the agency at once) is quite some
Agriculture, et al.
thing else.
No. 82-1695.
The majority opinion, as I understand it,
does not reject this basis of distinction, but
United States Court of Appeals,
reverses the Board for not expressly stating
District of Columbia Circuit.
that this was the reason the earlier "duty to
Argued Feb. 16, 1983.
investigate” cases were inapplicable. That
imposes a degree of refinement which I find
Decided Sept. 13, 1983.
inappropriate for such discretionary deci
As Amended Sept. 28, 1983.
sions. I think it no more arbitrary for the
Board to fail to distinguish its arguably but
not clearly inconsistent precedent when it
Sierra Club brought action challenging
makes fee-award determinations, than it is
decision
by the United States Forest Ser
arbitrary for us to fail to do so when we
award or deny attorneys’ fees, e.g., Order, vice and the Department of the Interior to
issue oil and gas leases on lands within two
Greene
v.Gibralter Mortgage Investment
Co., No. 82-1391 (D.C.Cir. May 31,1983); or national forests without requiring prepara
when we deny a motion for stay, e.g., Or tion of environmental impact statement.
der, Defenders of Wildlife v. The Endan The United States District Court for the
gered Species Scientific Authority, No. 83- District of Columbia, Aubrey E. Robinson,
1019 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 27,1983). For agencies, Jr., Chief Judge, upheld decision to issue
no less than for courts, it is unnecessary to the leases without preparing an environ
provide the same high degree, not merely of mental impact statement, and plaintiff ap
consistency, but of explicit justification for pealed. The Court of Appeals, MacKinnon,
all determinations. For highly discretion Senior Circuit Judge, held that the Depart
ary judgments such as the present one it ment had not complied with the National
suffices, I think, that there are in fact valid Environmental Policy Act because it sanc
grounds relied upon by the agency for tioned activities which had potential for
treating the case differently from earlier disturbing the environment without fully
cases. To require that the agency not assessing possible environmental conse
merely allude to those grounds (which it did quences.
here) but also identify them as the specific
Judgment accordingly.
reason for departing from arguably applica
ble precedent, is to impose intricacies of
process reserved for more important and
less discretionary determinations. In hold 1. Health and Environment <&=>25.15(6)
An agency’s finding of “no significant
ing otherwise, the court continues the pro
gressive complication of agency process and impact” and consequent decision not to pre
encourages the progressive trivialization of pare an environmental impact statement
can only be overturned if the decision was.
the business of appellate courts.
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre
tion; judicial review of an agency’s finding
of "no significant impact” is not, however,
merely perfunctory as court must ensure
that the agency took a “hard look” at envi
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ronmental consequences of its decision.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
§ 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.

2. Health and Environment «=>25.15(6)
In reviewing an agency’s finding of “no
significant impact” of a proposed action on
environment so as to preclude necessity of
preparing an environmental impact state
ment, court ascertains whether the agency
took a “hard look” at the problem; whether
it identified relevant areas of environmen
tal concern; as to problems studied and
identified, whether it made a convincing
case that the impact was insignificant; and
if there was an impact of true significance,
whether it convincingly established that
changes in the project sufficiently reduced
it to a minimum. National Environmental
Policy A ct of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C.A. §
4332.

3. Health and Environment 0=25.10(2)
Decision by the United States Forest
Service and the Department of Interior to
issue leases constituting an irrevocable com
mitment to allow some surface-disturbing
activities, including drilling and road build
ing, in 28,000 acre “non-highly environmen
tally sensitive lands” located in two nation
al forests without requiring an environmen
tal impact statement violated the National
Environmental Policy Act because it sanc
tioned activities which had potential for
disturbing the environment without fully
assessing possible environmental conse
quences. National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.

4. Health and Environment <3=25.10(2)
An environmental impact statem ent is
required when critical agency decision is
made which results in irreversible and irret
rievable commitments of resources to an
action which will affect the environment
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
§ 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.
Civil Action No. 81-01230).

Karin P. Sheldon, Denver, Colo., for ap
pellant.
Claire L. McGuire, Atty., Dept, of Justice,
Washington, D.C., with whom Robert L.
Klarquist, Washington, D.C., was on the
brief for appellees, U.S.A.
R. Brooke Jackson, Denver, Colo., with
whom John F. Shepherd, Denver, Colo., was
on the brief for appellees, Wexpro Compa
ny, et al.
Gerry Levenberg, Washington, D.C., was
on the brief for Bill J. Maddon, et al.
Before WRIGHT and SCALIA, Circuit
Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior
Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge:
In proceedings in the district court, the
Sierra Club challenged the decision by the
United States Forest Service (Forest Ser
vice) and the Department of the Interior
(Department) to issue oil and gas leases on
lands within the Targhee and Bridger-Teton National Forests of Idaho and Wyo
ming. The plaintiff alleged that the leas
ing program violated the National Environ
mental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 e t seq. (1976), because no Environ
mental Impact Statement (EIS) was pre
pared prior to the action. On cross-motion
for summary judgment the district court
upheld the decision to issue the leases with
out preparing an EIS. Sierra Club v. Pe
terson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. March 31,1982).
The plaintiff appeals from a portion of the
judgment and we reverse the decision of
the district court.

I.
The land originally involved in this dis
pute encompassed a 247,000 acre roadless
area in the Targhee and Bridger-Teton Na
tional Forests of Idaho and Wyoming,
known as the Palisades Further Planning
Area. In its most recent Roadless Review
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and Evaluation, RARE II,1 the Forest Ser tions require the lessee to obtain approval
vice designated this entire area as a Fur from the Interior Department before un
ther Planning Area and consequently, the dertaking any surface disturbing activity on
land may be considered for all uses, includ the lease, but do not authorize the Depart
ing oil and gas exploration, as long as its ment to preclude any activities which the
potential wilderness quality is preserved. lessee might propose. The Department can
In 1980, the Forest Service received appli
cations for oil and gas leases in the Pali
sades Further Planning Area.2 After con
ducting an Environmental Assessment
(EA), the Forest Service recommended
granting the lease applications, but with
various stipulations attached to the leases.
Because the Forest Service determined that
issuance of the leases with the recom
mended stipulations would not result in sig
nificant adverse impacts to the environ
ment, it decided that, with respect to the
entire area, no Environmental Impact
Statement was required at the leasing
stage.
The leasing program approved by the
Forest Service divides the land within the
Palisades Further Planning Area into two
categories—“highly environmentally sensi
tive” 3 lands and non-highly environmental
ly sensitive lands. The stipulations at
tached to each lease are determined by the
particular character of the land. All of the
leases for the Palisades contain “standard” 4
and “special” 5 stipulations. These stipula1. Two Roadless Area Review and Evaluations
(RARE 1 and II) were conducted by the Forest
Service to evaluate undeveloped areas within
National Forests in order to recommend appro
priate areas to Congress for designation as part
of the National Wilderness Preservation Sys
tem. See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et
seq. (1976).
As a result of RARE II, areas studied by the
Forest Service were classified as either Wilder
ness, Non-wilderness or Further Planning Ar
eas. Further Planning Areas, such as the Pali
sades, are lands which require additional, more
intensive study before the Forest Service can
recommend Wilderness or Non-wildemess sta
tus to Congress. Until a decision is reached on
the ultimate status of the land, its present char
acter is to be maintained.
2. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C.
§ 226 (1976), authorizes the leasing of lands
owned by the United States for the purpose of
oil and gas exploration and development.
3. “Highly environmentally sensitive” areas are
defined in the Environmental Assessment as

only impose conditions upon the lessee’s use
of the leased land.
In addition, a No Surface Occupancy
Stipulation (NSO Stipulation) is attached to
the leases for lands designated as “highly
environmentally sensitive.” This NSO Stip
ulation precludes surface occupancy unless
and until such activity is specifically ap
proved by the Forest Service.
For leases without a No Surface Occu
pancy Stipulation, the lessee must file an
application for a permit to drill prior to
initiating exploratory drilling activities.
The application must contain a surface use
and operating plan which details the pro
posed operations including access roads,
well site locations, and other planned facili
ties. On land leased without a No Surface
Occupancy Stipulation the Department can
not deny the permit to drill; it can only
impose “reasonable” conditions which are
designed to mitigate the environmental im
pacts of the drilling operations. See Joint
Appendix (JA) at 86a.
those areas "with definable environmental
characteristics which would be irreversibly al
tered by exploration activities.” Environmen
tal Assessment for Oil and Gas Exploration in
the Palisades Further Planning Area, Joint Ap
pendix (JA) at 150. These areas include lands
necessary for the protection of threatened or
endangered wildlife species; lands with slope
gradients of more than 40%; lands with re
gionally unique plant or animal species; and
lands with significant cultural resources. Id.
4. The “standard” stipulations include the Stip
ulation for lands under jurisdiction of the De
partment of Agriculture, 3109-3 (JA at 85), the
Surface Disturbance Stipulation, 3109-5 (JA at
86a), and the Forest Service Supplement to
Form 3109-3 (JA at 87).
5. “Special” stipulations include the Further
Planning Area Stipulation, the Coordination
Exploration Stipulation: Standard and Jackson
Hole Area and others which are specially de
signed to protect particular environmental con
cerns. See, e.g., JA at 89-100.
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II.

Following jm unsuccessful administrative
challenge to the decision to issue all the
leases in accord with the Forest Service’s
plan, the Sierra Club sought declaratory
and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.
The Sierra Club argued that leasing land
within the Palisades without preparing an
EIS violated NEPA. The federal defend
ants * responded that because of the finding
of “no significant impact” contained in the
Environmental Assessment, it was not nec
essary to prepare an EIS.
The district court upheld the finding of
“no significant impact” and the decision to
lease without preparing an EIS. The court
based its decision upon the conclusion that
the lease stipulations were valid and that
the government could thereby “preclude
any development under the leases.” Sierra
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230, slip op. at 12
n. 5 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982). The court
granted the federal defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, stating that “[t]he stip
ulations included in the leases . . . will e f
fectively insure that the environment will
not be significantly affected until further
analysis pursuant to N EPA .”
at 13-14.
The Sierra Club appeals only that portion
of the district court’s judgm ent which in
volves lands leased without a No Surface
Occupancy Stipulation. The Sierra Club
concedes that the Department retains the
authority to preclude all surface disturbing
activities on land leased with a NSO Stipu
lation until further site-specific environ
mental studies are made. By retaining this
authority, the Department has insured that
no significant environmental impacts can
occur from the act of leasing lands subject
to the NSO Stipulation.

Stipulation. Only the remainder, approxi
mately 28,000 acres, is at issue in this ap
peal. As to this smaller area, the Sierra
Club contends that the Department cannot
preclude surface disturbing activities, in
cluding drilling, on lands leased without the
NSO Stipulation. The Department has
only retained, Sierra Club asserts, the au
thority to "condition” surface disturbing ac
tivities in an effort to “m itigate” any envi
ronmental harm which might result from
the activities. Thus, some surface disturb
ing activities may result from the act of
issuing leases without NSO Stipulations on
lands within the 28,000 acres. Appellant
asserts, therefore, that the finding of “no
significant impact” and the decision not to
prepare an EIS, insofar as land leased with
in this smaller area is concerned, was im
proper. Because on these leases the Secre
tary cannot preclude surface disturbing ac
tivity, including drilling, the Sierra Club
argues that the decision to lease is itself the
point of irreversible, irretrievable commit
ment of resources—the point at which
NEPA mandates that an environmental im
pact statement be prepared. We agree.

III.

Approximately 80% of the Palisades was
designated as highly environmentally sensi
tive ?.nd, therefore, leased with the NSO

The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) requires preparation of an Envi
ronmental Impact Statem ent whenever a
proposed major federal action will signifi
cantly affect the quality of the human envi
ronment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1976).
To determine the nature of the environmen
tal impact from a proposed action and
whether an EIS will be required, federal
agencies prepare an environmental assess
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) & (c) (1982).
If on the basis on the Environmental As
sessm ent the agency finds that the pro
posed action will produce “no significant

6. The lessees were allowed to intervene as de
fendants in the district court proceedings. The
“Wexpro” intervenors include Wexpro Co.,
Sun Exploration and Production Co., Anschutz
Corp., and Champlin Petroleum Co. These
companies hold the majority of the leases on
the Idaho portion of the Palisades. The “Mad-

dox” intervenors include Bill J. Maddox, Ruth
Maddox, Kenneth F. Cummings, A.W. Fleming
and Co., and Placid Oil Co. These individuals
and enterprises are also lessees of the lands at
issue.
Both groups of intervenors participated in
this appeal.
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impact on the environment, then an EIS stipulations will prevent any significant en
need not be prepared.
at § 1501.4(e). vironmental impacts until a site-specific
[1]
An agency’s finding of "no signifi plan for exploration and development is
cant impact” and consequent decision not to submitted by the lessee. At that time, the
prepare an EIS can only be overturned if federal appellees explain, an appropriate
the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an environmental analysis, either an Environ
abuse of discretion. Cabinet Mountains mental Assessment or an EIS, will be pre
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681 pared. In bifurcating its environmental
(D.C.Cir.1982); Committee for Auto Re analysis, however, the agency has taken a
sponsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002 foreshortened view of the impacts which
(D.C.Cir.1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 915, could result from the act of leasing. The
100 S.Ct. 1274, 63 L.Ed.2d 599 (1980). Judi agency has essentially assumed that leasing
cial review of an agency’s finding of “no is a discrete transaction which will not re
significant impact” is not, however, merely sult in any “physical or biological impacts."
perfunctory as the court must insure that The Environmental Assessment concludes
the agency took a “hard look” at the envi
that there will be no significant adverse
ronmental consequences of its decision.
effects on the human environment due to
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.
oil and gas lease issuance. Therefore, no
21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L.Ed.2d 576
environmental impact statement will be
(1976).
prepared. The determination was based
upon consideration of the following fac
[2,3] Cases in this circuit have em
tors . . . (a) few issued leases result in
ployed a four-part test to scrutinize an
active exploration operations and still
agency’s finding of “no significant impact."
fewer
result in discovery or production of
The court ascertains
oil or gas; (b) the act of issuing a lease
(1) whether the agency took a “hard
involves no physical or biological impacts;
look” at the problem;
(c) the cumulative environmental effect
(2) whether the agency identified the rel
of lease issuance on an area-wide basis is
evant areas of environmental con
very small; (d) effects of lease activities
cern;
once permitted will be mitigated to pro
(3) as to the problems studied and identi
tect areas of critical environmental con
fied, whether the agency made a con
cern by appropriate stipulations including
vincing case that the impact was in
no-surface occupancy; (e) if unacceptable
significant; and
environmental impacts cannot be correct
ed, activities will not be permitted; and
(4) if there was an impact of true signifi
(f) the action will not have a significant
cance, whether the agency convinc
effect on the human environment.
ingly established that changes in the
project sufficiently reduced it to a
minimum.
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, supra, 685
F.2d at 682. Applying the foregoing test to
this agency decision, we are satisfied that
the agency has taken the requisite “hard
look” and has “identified the relevant areas
of environmental concern.” However, in
our opinion, the finding that “no significant
impact” will occur as a result of granting
leases without an NSO Stipulation is not
supportable on this record.
The finding of “no significant impact” is
premised upon the conclusion that the lease

Finding of No Significant Impact, Environ
mental Assessment, JA at 26-27. The con
clusion that no significant impact will occur
is improperly based on a prophecy that ex
ploration activity on these lands will be
insignificant and generally fruitless.
While it may well be true that the major
ity of these leases will never reach the
drilling stage and that the environmental
impacts of exploration are dependent upon
the nature of the activity, nevertheless
NEPA requires that federal agencies deter
mine at the outset whether their major
actions can result in “significant” environ
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mental impacts. Here, the Forest Service
concluded that any impacts which might
result from the act of leasing would either
be insignificant or, if significant, could be
mitigated by exercising the controls provid
ed in the lease stipulations.
Even assuming, arguendo, that all lease
stipulations are fully enforceable, once the
land is leased the Department no longer has
the authority to preclude surface disturbing
activities even if the environmental impact
of such activity is significant. The Depart
ment can only impose “mitigation” meas
ures upon a lessee who pursues surface dis
turbing exploration and/or drilling activi
ties. None of the stipulations expressly
provides that the Department or the Forest
Service can prevent a lessee from conduct
ing surface disturbing activities.7 Thus,
with respect to the smaller area with which
we are here concerned, the decision to allow
surface disturbing activities has been made
at the leasing stage and, under NEPA, this
is the point at which the environmental
impacts of such activities must be evaluat
ed.
[4] NEPA requires an agency to evalu
ate the environmental effects of its action
at the point of commitment. The purpose
of an EIS is to insure that the agency
considers all possible courses of action and
assesses the environmental consequences of
each proposed action. The EIS is a deci
sion-making tool intended to “insure that
7. We do not agree with the district court’s
unsupported conclusion that the Secretary can
preclude “any development” under the lease.
Sierra Club, supra, slip op. at 12 n. 5. In
addition to the fact that the lease stipulations
themselves do not expressly permit preclusion,
when questioned on this point at oral argu
ment, counsel for the government stated:
The government has never contended that we
would preclude all development. We did in
fact contend before the district court . . . that
in the Conditional No Surface Occupancy ar
eas, those that are highly sensitive, we could
preclude development.
In response to the court’s question as to wheth
er the agency could refuse to approve a lessee’s
plan to build an access road (a surface disturb
ing activity) during exploration, counsel for the
government stated:
There’s a very fine line between preclusion
and strict control. The agency has retained

. . . environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking
. . . ”
42
U.S.C.
§ 4332(2XB). Therefore, the appropriate
time for preparing an EIS is prior to a
decision, when the decisionmaker retains a
maximum range of options. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 85253 (9th Cir.1979). Accord, Port o f Astoria
v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 478 (9th Cir.1979)
(NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared
“at an early stage when alternative courses
of action are still possible. . . . ”); Scientists'
Inst, for Public Information, Inc. v. A tom ic
Energy Com m ’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (In determining when to prepare
an EIS the agency must ascertain to what
extent its decision embodies an “irretrieva
ble commitment” of resources which pre
cludes the exercise of future “options.”).
An EIS is required when the “critical agen
cy decision” is made which results in “irrev
ersible and irretrievable commitments of
resources” to an action which will affect the
environment. Mobil Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 562
F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977). On the facts of
this case, that “critical time,” insofar as
lands leased without a NSO Stipulation are
concerned, occurred at the point of leasing.
Notwithstanding the assurance that a la
ter site-specific environmental analysis will
be made, in issuing these leases the Depart
ment made an irrevocable commitment to
allow some surface disturbing activities, instrict control. They have the authority.
They have the right to put certain conditions
on road building.
[The government has] never contended
that we could preclude all exploration and all
development in these non-highly sensitive ar
eas.
Furthermore, counsel for the Sierra Club as
serted without contradiction that the govern
ment could not deny an application for a permit
to drill, but could only enforce the lease stipula
tions to control and/or mitigate any environ
mental damage which result from the drilling.
We conclude from the language of the lease
stipulations, the briefs of the parties, and the
statements of counsel at oral argument that
once the land is leased the Secretary cannot
preclude surface disturbing activities, in either
the exploratory or the development stage, on
the 28,000 acres here in question.
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eluding drilling and roadbuilding. While
theoretically the proposed two-stage envi
ronmental analysis may be acceptable, in
this situation the Department has not com
plied with NEPA because it has sanctioned
activities which have the potential for dis
turbing the environment without fully as
sessing the possible environmental conse
quences.
The Department asserts that it cannot
accurately evaluate the consequences of
drilling and other surface disturbing activi
ties until site-specific plans are submitted.
If, however, the Department is in fact con
cerned that it cannot foresee and evaluate
the environmental consequences of leasing
without site-specific proposals, then it may
delay preparation of an EIS provided that
it reserves both the authority to preclude all
activities pending submission of site-specific
proposals and the authority to prevent pro
posed activities if the environmental conse
quences are unacceptable. If the Depart
ment chooses not to retain the authority to
preclude all surface disturbing activities,
then an EIS assessing the full environmen
tal consequences of leasing must be prepar
ed at the point of commitment—when the
leases are issued. The Department can de
cide, in the first instance, by which route it
will proceed.

Department retains the authority to pre
clude all surface disturbing activities pend
ing submission of a lessee’s site-specific pro
posal as well as the authority to refuse to
approve proposed activities which it deter
mines will have unacceptable environmental
impacts, then the Department can defer its
environmental evaluation until such sitespecific proposals are submitted. If, how
ever, it is unable to preclude activities
which might have unacceptable environ
mental consequences, then the Department
cannot issue leases sanctioning such activi
ties without first preparing an EIS.
Because we find that the Department did
not comply with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act when it
leased the 28,000 acres of non-highly envi
ronmentally sensitive lands within the Pali
sades, we reverse the judgment of the dis
trict court and remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opin
ion.
Judgment accordingly.
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Eleanor GROPER, Appellant

The National Environmental Policy Act
requires federal agencies to evaluate the
environmental consequences of their actions
prior to commitment to any actions which
might affect the quality of the human envi
ronment. If any “significant” environmen
tal impacts might result from the proposed
agency action then an EIS must be prepar
ed before the action is taken.

v.

In this case, the Department failed to
fully assess the environmental consequences
of its decision to issue leases without NSO
Stipulations on the 23,000 acres in question.
To comply with NEPA, the Department
must either prepare an EIS prior to leasing
or retain the authority to preclude surface
disturbing activities until an appropriate
environmental analysis is completed. If the
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Interlocutory appeal was taken from
an order entered by the United States Dis
trict Court for the District of Columbia,
Thomas F. Hogan, J., granting defendant’s
motion to disqualify plaintiff’s trial counsel
from further representation in underlying

ATTACHMENT B
C o n d i t i o n a l No S u r f a c e Occupancy S t i p u l a t i o n

Toe 1 ez_s.ee agrees not to occupy or use the surface of the leased lanes
(le g a l description) except for
la
certain lim ited uses as permitted in w riting by at authorized office:
the su r fa c e aanagenen: agency. This stip ulation , at a later cate, nay
n tec. elim inated, or rent i t ut chatted. A l t e r a t i o
he n o t i f i e d , svrppl
of the stim ulation u t i l he conditional upon the preparation o: a s it e sp ec ific en virom en tal assessment, or i f .required, at environmental
statement. In the event this stipulation is eliminated, it vill he
replaced hy a coordinated eccploraticn stipulation and other special
stip u latio n s as required to protect the surface resources.
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Thtf Mcbon of the FEDERAL REGISTER

separately.-or coDectively if applications

comjura oocumvm ccw thin ru*«* or
could be logically grouped. In
?ropo**tf rw*« tne
atDMconducting
» tn*
environmental analysis of a
pu&Jc. None** of h«C T gi and
lease application, the Forest Service has
nwesupabora, xcw rvs*t m*t*inp, apwry
assumed that issuance of s lease would
o*as<ons and rufcnpv osJspstioos d
result
tn driTlrng and in productive webs
auowory, fihng of pfritosaand
canting
extensive impacts on surface
aaptaaDom and ■apancy canamantt o(
resources!
Using this assumption as a
orpanczten and farcbona an anmplai .
basis for analyzing leasing impacts and
cf ooojn>anis appaaring in inis aacbon.

ior arriving at recommendations to BLM

Vi»tpmvoi firm*mncn-niTtg»rwtcostlyE)

DEPARTMENT Of AGRICULTURE
Forest Service !V - \ . V .**- J
Test ot a Donrinperri Right Stipuiarboo
to be lociubed tn Geothermal and
Noncom petitive OB and Gas le a s e s
a c e n o t . F o r e s t S e rv ic e , USDA. .
a c t io n :

N o tic e .

summary: Toe

? crest Service
announces that it wiD recommend or
consent to issue oD end gas and
geothermal leases which itirdnrir a
contingent right stipulation. Areas wiD
.-"^“.selected on which to test the use cd
stipulation. Criteria a rt heron
■•.•.v;:;:icrussed ior selection of areas where
the stipulation-will be nsec. This action
is consistent with thet of the Department
of the Interior widen approved the use of
a contingent right stipulation on
noncompetitive oil and gas leases cn
February 24.1922. .
EFFECTIVE date May 28. 1982.
address: R. Max Peterson. Chief Forest
Service, USDA- Rm. 833-RPZ. P.0. Bex2417, Washington. D-C. 20013.
FDR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert F. May, Forest Service, USDA.
Minerals and Geology Management
Staff. P.O. Bax 2417, Rm. 803^RFE,
Washington, D.C. 20013. (703) 235-S718.
SUPPLEMENT ART INFORMATION: T h e

Forest Service administers
approximately 19CL7 million acres of
National Forest System lends, most of
which are e variable for oil and gas cr
geothermal leasing. Over 7,000 lease
applications ior National Forest System
lands ere filed each year with the
Bureau of Land Management (ELM). The
Forest Service is responsible for
determining if
tlease proposal is .
compatible with other resource usei‘
.::u:3n d if so. under what conditions 8 lease
O^ySill be issued. Until now the Forest
eroce examined tech application

many cases.
Experience has ahown that less than 3
percent of all Federal oil and gas leases'
issued nationally are actually drilled,
end even fewer result in productive
wells. Tons, the present approach to
enalyai* on least applications has
resulted in excessive backlog* and
expense that hat proven difficult to
justify.
• • - .
•’
In several lawsuits involving National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
issues, the courts have endorsed
segmented rittHainrmiaV'mg.
Segmentation occurs in a Federal
mineral disposal context where there u
“separate utility'’ in the granting of
lease* and the later approval of each
subsequent stage of operations,.
including prospecting, exploration, end
production.
. ••
Use of the contingent right stipulation
ii based on the premise that NEPA
environmental analyses can he most
effectively handled at the operational
stage of the lease. after submission of
specific proposal Each proposal must he
approved before operations can begin.
However, it is expected that rarely will
the leasee/operator and tire Government
fail to agree on an acceptable plan of
operation* and thereby invoke the
contingent right stipulation.
To test the acceptance and
workability of the contingent right
stipulation, the Forest Sendee w01 select
certain National Forest area* within
which the stipulation will he considered
for all geothermal and noncompetitive
oil and gas leases issued during the test
period. AD designated wildernesses.
Congressional}? mandated wilderness
study area* and Administrationendorsed wilderness proposal* will be
excluded (see 45 FR 26667 of May 14,
1981). If a roadless area designated ior
farther planning is selected the
contingent right stipulation will take
precedence over the further planning

Wedj>e*ciy. AprD M. 3BO

stipulation (tee Forest S ern a Manual
2822.43). Tne stipulation wfl] not be
applied to leases issued under the
simultaneous filing sysiejn. .
No environmental assessment prior to
leasing wOl be necessary for leases to •
he issued subject to the contingent right
stipulation. Tne contingent right
stipulation will he used in those areas where additional protection is needed
beyond that provided by standard lease
term* mn conditions. If it is determined
tint the contingent right stipulation w£D not he used, the usual environmental -.,
assessment process w21 he followed. In '
either situation, standard lease term* ' •
end condition* wiD be required in the
leases.
The tod-of 1be Contingent Ri^it
SirotUBPcm it as tdlTPVg’E
1
All operation* on this lease art
subject to Government approval with
such site-specific stipule bon* a* may he
necessary to assure reasonable
protection of or mitigstion of -efiects on
other values. A plan of operation* sbaD
not he approved if it results in
unacceptable impact on other resources,
land uses, and/or the environment. If for
these reasons e plan of operations- • „
cannot be approved, the lease term may
be suspended for up to 5 years subject to
timely submittal of an appropriate
application by the lessee for c
suspension of operating and producing
•requirements of the lease and approval .
by the United States. L1the conditions
do not change sufficiently, and/or
significantly improved technique* are
not developed such that a plan of
operations has not been approved - •
during the suspended term of the least,
the suspension shall automatically •" •
terminate. Unless relinquished sooner,
the leese will continue for the term
remaining at the effective daie of the .
suspension or, if Dot suspended, for the
term remaining when the plan of
operation* was disapproved, subject to
Government approval of all operation*
as provided herein, without recourse for
compenstion. •

Dougin R.Lein,
Axtodole Chief."

April 221882.

.

[TRDocE-51S5*fW <-©-e:tcus)
BtUUWCCODEX10-1V-K

.

. -

prr,f"jl
i:;.. .

kr~ f* c \ \ j £ 0

ATTACHMENT D

. GEOLOGY.
,-r>

K;\i< 1 a

o^-*s
•ctor
Zbto

nr.d L»w Exomin#r
r.z Cxnnr«in«c
____C o m p te r

Analyst

_______ Cca?o-‘cr Assistant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

, i\c :v '*■- o«-o!cr::ct
--------P r -

r.*. Cc.orc: nator,

RECEIVED

BUTTE DIVISION

----- ,wCr,iiOfr..tt

MAR 1 5 1985

___ ^; ; o-iSJtiSt

OGC MISSOULA

___ Pro^rLm A^Utar.t
r- •~ ~v~y
___^ knr,pi.t[AMEg r — CO N N ER .

et

a l.,

)

P lain tiffs,
vs.

)

ROBERT BURFORD,

et

a l.,

by p l a i n t i f f s
F ed era tio n

th is

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

)

Defendants.

Before

NO. CV-82-42-BU

)

)

court are m otions

for

summary judgment

James R. Conner and t h e Montana W i l d l i f e
and

by

defendants

The

Bureau

of

Land

Management, t h e F o r e s t S e r v i c e , and o t h e r s ,

involving

issuance

areas

of

o il

an d g a s

leases

of

F l a t h e a d and G a l l a t i n N a t i o n a l F o r e s t s .

vast

the

of the

Jurisdiction

over

t h i s a c t i o n i s based on 28 U. S. C. § 1 331.
P la in tiffs
decisions

ask the co u r t to d e c l a r e

unlaw ful

the

by t h e C h i e f o f t h e F o r e s t S e r v i c e , t h e D i r e c t o r

o f t h e Bureau o f Land Management and t h e S e c r e t a r y o f

the

I n t e r i o r —to_der»y . p l a i n t i f f s ‘ p r o t e s t s and a p p e a l s a g a i n s t
t h e i s s u a n c e o f o i l and gas l e a s e s
(\LS-o
cF

in t h e F l a t h e a d and t h e
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contend

E nvironm ental

that

P olicy

Act

§ § 4 3 2 1 e t s e q . , by f a i l i n g t o p r e p a r e
.-—
■ ■
' 1 *>
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F urther ,
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such
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set

asid e

A dm in istrative

issuan ce

of

The

"

asked to
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the
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action s
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endangered
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that
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stage
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threatened
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federal
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such an a c t i o n ,

and a n a l y z e

d ecid in g .w h a t

the

i n i t i a t e d a "major f e d e r a l

action s i g n i f i c a n t l y

defendants did i n i t i a t e

ACT

they are

human
If

the

required
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§70G,

oil
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recommendations
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and i s s u a n c e
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leases

p e n d i n g c o m p l i a n c e w i t h NEPA and ESA.
P lain tiffs'

m o t i o n f o r summary judgment i s GRANTED.

D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r summary judgment i s DENIED.
P a r t i e s s h a l l b e a r t h e i r own c o s t s .
DATED t h i s

day o f March, 1 9 8 5 .

^ PAUL G. HATFIELD
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the application of the “rule of reason,” TEE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE
namely, that impact# need only be con
MENT WILDERNESS REVIEW
sidered (1) which can reasonably be an
AND VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
ticipated to occur prior to the completion
of the project, or (2) which will defi
M-36910 (Sapp.)
nitely occur before or after completion
of the project under consultation.
October 6,
I am not persuaded th at these limita
tions should be placed on the “role of rea Federal Land Policy and Management
son" test. If other activities (both private
Act of 1976: Wilderness
and governmental) crfn be reasonably an
ticipated to Impact the endangered spe Valid existing rights are limitations
cies or its critical habitat, those impacts upon the Secretary's authority to manage
should be included within the scope of activities occurring within wilderness
the consultation; To exclude considera ''stu d y area under the nonimpairment
standard. In general, the nonimpairment
tion of activities and projects which will
standard remains the management norm
occur after the completion of the project
under consultation could result in our unless it would preclude enjoyment of the
Ignoring Impacts which are likely to rights. When it is determined th at the
rights can be enjoyed only through activ
occur and otherwise cognizable under the
ities that will permanently impair an
“rule of reason.” Likewise, projects and
area’s
suitability, the Secretary must
activities for which administrative dis
manage
the lands to prevent unnecessary
cretion remains should also be con
and
undue
degradation and to afford en
sidered. The degree of administrative
discretion, and the likelihood of that dis vironmental protection.
cretion being exercised in a manner to
Solicitor’s Opinion M-36910, 86 I.D.
diminish impact on the subject species,
89 (1979), modified.
are matters which should be included un
der the “rule of reason” te s t
OPINION BY OFFICE
In conclusion, the opinion of May 25,
OF THE SOLICITOR
1978 is reissued with the removal of the
two limitations in the first full paragraph
T o : S ecretary
on the last page. The "rule of reason” F r o m : S o lic ito r
test should be used to evaluate Impacts
S u b j e c t : T h e BLM W il d e r n e ss
which can reasonably be anticipated to
R e v ie w
and
V a lid
E x is t in g
occur from projects and activities before
or after the completion of the project R io h t s
under consultation or on which adminis
/. INTRODUCTION
trative discretion remains. These projects
On Sept. 5, 1978, the Solicitor
and activities, along with their Impacts,
should be considered and given an appro issued opinion M-36910, 86 I.D. 89
priate weight in the application of the
(1979), interpreting sec. 603 of the
“rule of reason.”
Federal Land Policy and Manage
The reissued opinion, modified as in ment Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C.
dicated in this memorandum, is attached.
L eo M. K btjltz

§ 1782. In addition, two supplemen
tary memoranda have been issued.
The first, the memorandum of Aug.
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(88 I.D.

7, 1979 (“Palmer Oil/Prairie Can (1963). See also Cameron v. United
yon”), reviewed the “grandfather States, 252 U.S. 450,459-60 (1920);
dal, 373 U.S. 472,
U
clause” of sec. 603. The second, Boesche v.
the memorandum of Feb. 12, 1980 477-78 (1963). See generally 30
(“Further Guidance on FLPM A’s U.S.C. §§22, 189; 43 U.S.C. §§ 2,
section 603”), discussed the Bureau 1712. With the enactment of
of Land Management’s Interim FLPM A , Congress has restricted
Management Plan and valid exist the Secretary’s discretion in man
ing rights in the context of mining aging the public lands by imposing
claims located pursuant to the gen two standards to guide management
decisions. The first is a general
eral mining laws.
This opinion addresses the rela standard applicable to all manage
tionship between valid existing ment activities: “In managing the
rights and the wilderness review public lands the Secretary shall, by
requirements of sec. 603.1 It modifies regulation or otherwise, take any
Solicitor’s Opinion No. M-36910 action necessary to prevent unnec
and incorporates the memorandum essary and undue degradation of
the lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
of Feb. 12,1980.
The second and more stringent lim i
II. THE NONIMPAIRMENT
tation is part of the wilderness re
STANDARD AND ITS E X  view mandated by sec. 603 of
CEPTIONS AND LIM ITA FLPM A. 43 U.S.C. § 1782.
TIONS
Under sec. 603 of FLPM A , the
Secretary is directed to review the
Congress has delegated to the Sec
public lands and identify those
retary general and comprehensive
areas that meet the wilderness cri
authority to manage the public teria contained in sec. 2 (c) of the
lands. A s the Supreme Court has Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131
noted, the Secretary “has been (c). Those areas that have wilder
granted plenary authority over the ness characteristics are then to be
administration of public lands * * * studied to determine their suitabil
and * * * has been given broad au ity for'inclusion in the National
thority to issue regulations concern Wilderness Preservation System.
ing them.” Best v. Humboldt Placer The Secretary is required to make
Mining
.C
o, 371 U.S. 334,recommendations
336
on their suitabil
ity or nonsuitability to the Presi
1 Tbit opinion formalizes and la consistent
dent by O ct 21, 1991. In turn, the
with the position adopted by the Department
on appeal from the decision of Rocky Moun
President makes recommendations
tain Oil d Gas Association v. Andrus, 500 F.
Sapp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), appeal docketed, to the Congress which decides which
No. 81-1040 (10th Cir. Jan. 5. 1981). Al
areas will be designated wilderness.
though consistent with the result reached by
Sec. 603(c) establishes a specific
the court in regard to allowing actlrlties on
oil and gas leases Issued prior to Oct. 21, 1976
management standard, known as the
(pre-FLPMA leases), this opinion does not
“nonimpairment standard,” appliadopt the court's rationale.
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cable only during this wilderness
review:

911

under this Act shall be subject to valid
existing rights.

43 U.S.C. § 1701 note.
During the period of review of such
The clause limits the applicabil
[wilderness study) areas and until Con
gress has determined otherwise, the Sec ity of the nonimpainnent standard
retary
shall continue to manage by specifying that the standard can
lands according to his authority under
not be applied in a manner that
this Act and other applicable law In
would prevent the exercise of any
manner so as not to impair the suitability
of such areas for preservation as wilder “valid existing rights.”
ness, subject, however, to the continua
tion of existing mining and grazing uses
III. VALID EXISTING
and mineral leasing in the m anner and
RIGHTS
degree In which the same w as'being con
ducted on the date of approval of this
Although the legislative history
A c t: PROVIDED, That, In managing the
public lands the Secretary shall by regu is largely silent on the scope of this
lation or otherwise take any action re term,* it is not unique to FLPMA.
quired to prevent unnecessary or undue
The term has an extensive history
degradation of the lands and their re
both in the Department and the
sources or to afford environmental pro
courts.
tection.
In defining “valid existing
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (italics add
ed). See generally Solicitor’s Opin rights,” the Department distin
ion M-36910, 86 I.D. 89, 109-11 guishes three terms: “vested rights,”
“valid existing rights,” and “appli
(1979).
There is, however, an exception to cations” or “proposals.” 3“Valid ex
and a limitation on the nonimpair isting rights” are distinguished
ment standard. The exception is the from “applications” because such
section’s grandfather clause which rights are independent of any sec
authorizes the continuance of exist retarial discretion. They are prop
ing mining, grazing, and mineral erty interests rather than mere ex
leasing uses, “in the manner and de pectancies. Compare
v.
gree” in .which they were occurring
Nickel, 419 F.2d 663, 666-67 (D.C.
on Oct. 21, 1976, the date of enact Cir, 1969) and George J.
, 56
ment of FLPMA. This grandfather I.D. 347, 351 (1938) with Vdall v.
clause was analyzed in both the ini Tollman, 380 U.S. 1, 20 (1965),
tial Solicitor’s Opinion and the United Stated ex rel. McLennan V.
supplemental memorandum of
* Bee. generally H.R. Bep. No. 1724, 94th
Aug. 7,1979.
Cong., 2d Sest. 65 (1976), reprinted in Senate
The limitation on the nonimpair Comm, on Energy A Natural Resources, 95th
Cong„ 2d Seas., LegUlotive History of the
ment standard, and the subject of Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
this opinion, is the savings clause of 197S a t '871, 935 (Comm. Print 1978).
•Each of these terms applies only to third
sec. 701(h) of FLPMA. This sec parties. They do not apply to Interests of fed
eral agencies, departments, or agents. Bee, e.g.,
tion provides:
Toteneite of Liberty, 40 LB.L.A. 817, 319

All actions by the Secretary concerned

(1979).
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Wilbur, 283 U .S. 414, 420 (1931), the Secretary is not required to ap
prove
an application for a right-ofand Albert A.
Howe,26
I.B.L.A.
386, 387 (1976). “Valid existing
rights” are distinguished from
“vested rights” by degree: they be
come vested rights when all of the
statutory requirements required to
pass equitable or legal title have
been satisfied.4 Compare
v.
United States, 260 U.S. 532, 544
(1923) with 'Wyoming v. United
States,255 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1921)
and Wirth v. Branson, 98 U .S. 118,
121 (1878). Thus, “valid existing
rights” are those rights short of
vested rights that are immune from
denial or extinguishment by the
exercise of secretarial discretion.
Valid existing rights may arise
in two situations. First, a statute
may prescribe a series of require
ments which, if satisfied, create
l ights in the claimant by the claim
ant’s actions under the statute with
out an intervening discretionary
act. The most obvious example is
the 1872 Mining Law: a claimant
who has made a discovery and prop
erly located a claim has a valid ex
isting right by his actions under the
statute; the Secretary has no discre
tion in processing any subsequent
patent application. Second, a valid
existing right may be created as a
result of the exercise of secretarial
discretion. For example, although
4,rVested right*” has a narrower meaning
within public land law terminology than in
other areas of the law. In public land law,
“vested rights” typically applies to legal or
equitable rights to a fee title. See e.g., Wyo
ming v. United State*, eupra a t 501-02. Oil
and gas leases, which do not convey fee title,
have not been couched in terms of the tradi
tional “vested right” usage.

way, if an application is approved
the applicant has a valid existing
right to the extent of the rights
granted. Similarly, the Secretary
has discretion to approve, deny, or
suspend an application for an oil
und gas lease. Once the lease is
issued however, the applicant has
valid existing rights in the lease.
Valid existing rights are not,
however, absolute. The nature and
extent of the rights are defined
either by the statute creating the
rights or by the manner in which
the Secretary chose to exercise his
discretion.* See,
e.g, . Best v. Hu
boldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U .S.
334 (1963); Continental Oil Co. v.
United States, 184 F. 2d 802, 807
(9th Cir. 1950). Thus, it is not pos
sible to identify in the abstract
every interest that is a valid exist
ing right; the question turns upon
the interpretation of the applicable
statute and the nature of the rights
conveyed by approval of an appli
cation. Because of the importance
of the individual approval and its
stipulations, a review o f each ap• For example, there are Interests less than
leaseholds that are “valid existing rights.”
These Include noncompetitive (preference
right) coal lease applications th a t were pre
served by the “valid existing rights” clause
of sec. 4 of the Federal Coal Leasing Act
Amendments of 1975, 90 8 ta t 1085, amending
30 U.S.C. | 201(b) (1970). The Secretary does
not have the discretion to reject these appli
cations If the applicant can meet the statutory
test for lease issuance. Nevertheless, the right
to a lease does not accrue until th a t determi
nation has been made. WRDO v. Berklund, 609
F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah Interna
tional, Ine. V. Andru*, 488 F. Supp. 962, 969
(D. Utah 1979). The right preserved is to an
adjudication and, if that adjudication is favor
able, to a lease.
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REVIEW AND VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
October 5,

proval document will be required to
determine the precise scope of an
applicant’s valid existing rights
where such rights are created by an
act of Secretarial discretion.

ment The second variable is the
site-specific conditions confronting
the right holder. In general, how
ever, the nonimpairment standard
governs activities unless this would
unreasonably interfere with enjoy
IV. REGULATION OF VALID ment of the valid existing rights.
EXISTING RIGHTS UNDER "When the nonimpairment standard
SEC. 603 OF FLPMA
would unreasonably interfere with
the use of the rights conveyed, the
The determination that a particu
holder of the rights may exercise
lar interest is a “valid existing
the rights although it impairs the
right” is a limitation on the conarea’s suitability for preservation
gressionally mandated management
as wilderness. For example, under
standard applicable to activities oc
such circumstances a claimant with
curring within wilderness study
a valid mining claim under the
areas. Although the nonimpair
Mining Law of 1872 may develop
ment standard remains the norm,
the claim even if this impairs the
this standard cannot be enforced if
area’s suitability for wilderness
to do so would preclude recognition
preservation. Similarly, the holder
of the right or, in the case of an
of an oil and gas lease or a right-ofissued lease, would preclude de
way authorization issued prior to
velopment under the right. In gen
the enactment of FLPMA may de
eral, restrictions on the right de
velop the leasehold or right-of-way
signed to protect wilderness values
to the extent authorized by the
may not be so onerous that they
issuance or approval document.
unreasonably interfere with enjoy
It is important to note the dis
ment of the benefit of the right. In
tinction between pre- and postother words, regulations may not be FLPMA leases and authorizations.
“so prohibitively restrictive as to With the enactment of FLPMA on
render the land incapable of full O ct 21, 1976, the Secretary was re
economic development” Utah' v. quired to manage the public lands
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995,1010 (D. under wilderness review “so as not to
Utah 1979).
impair the suitability of such areas
The resolution of specific cases for preservation as wilderness.” 43
under these general guidelines is de U.S.C. § 1782(c). Thus applicants
pendent upon an analysis of two who received a lease or other use au
variables. The first is the scope of thorization after Oct. 21, 1976, for
developmental rights actually con lands within an area under wilder
veyed by the person’s actions under ness review did not receive an un
the statute or by the Department’s limited right to develop since after
issuance of the lease or other docu that date the Secretary had author-
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ity only to issue those leasee, per* V. CONCLUSION
mits, and licenses that would not im
Valid existing rights may be cre
pair an area’s suitability for pres
ated by operation of a statute or an
ervation as wilderness.
gener
act of secretarial discretion. A valid
ally Utah v.
s,486 F. Supp.
dru
n
A
mining claim, an oil and gas lease,
995,1006 (D. Utah 1979).
and a right-of-way authorization
The right to develop even if it
are examples of valid existing
impairs an area’s suitability docs
rights. I f such rights were created
not, however, mean that the right is
prior to the enactment of FLPMA,
unlimited. The Secretary remains
they limit the congressionally im
under a statutory mandate to man
posed nonimpairment standard. A l
age these areas and their resources:
though the nonimpairment stand
“in managing the public lands the
ard remains the norm, valid exist
Secretary shall by regulation or
ing rights that include the right to
otherwise take any action required
develop may not be regulated to the
to prevent unnecessary or undue
point where the regulation unreas
degradation of the lands and their
onably interferes with enjoyment of
resources or to afford environmental
the benefit of the right. Resolution
protection.” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).*
of specific cases will depend upon
By implication, this standard al
the nature of the rights conveyed
lows the Secretary to authorize uses
and the physical situation within
or activities necessary to the pur
the area. When it is determined that
poses of the valid existing rights
subject to reasonable mitigating the rights conveyed can be enjoyed
measures to protect environmental only through activities that will
values. The requirement that the permanently impair an area’s suit
Secretary regulate uses and activi ability for preservation as wilder
ties to prevent unnecessary and un ness, the activities are to be regula
due degradation and to afford en ted to prevent unnecessary and un
vironmental protection is consistent due degradation or to afford en
with the power of the Federal Gov vironmental protection. Neverthe
ernment to regulate property inter less, even if such activities impair
ests. Since the regulation extends at
a. minimum only to prohibiting ac U.S. 590 (1902). 81nee the management stand*
prohibits only “unnecessary and undue
tivities that are not necessary or ard
degradation,” It does not raise constitutional
that are excessive or unwarranted, issues, Second, the rights granted by the
United States are often expllclUy limited by
the taking issue is not implicated.’ the government’s authority to regulate. For
•Bee

le
o
43 D.8.C. | 1732(b).

TThese management requirements are com
patible with the concept of valid existing
rights. First, such rights may constitutionally
be regulated and their value diminished for
a proper governmental purpose. Bee, cp.,
Andrus v. Allard, 100 S.C t 318 (1979) ; Penn
Central Tramp . Co. v. City of Ne%o York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978) ; Goldblatt r. Hempstead, 369

example, the 1872 Mining Law provides that
"all valuable mineral deposits in lands belong
ing to the United States • • • shaU remain
free and open to exploration and pur
chase • • • under
regprescri
lam.” 30 U.S.C. | 22. Bee generally 30 U.8.C.
| 189; Boetehe v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 477-78
(1963) ; United Btotee t . Richardton, 599
F.2d 290 (9th Clr. 1979), cert, denied, 444
U.8. 1014 (1980).
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CLYDE K. KOBBEMAN
October
1981

the area’s suitability, they must be
allowed to proceed.
W il l ia m

H.

C old cron

Solicitor
CLYDE X. KOBBEMAN
58 IBLA 268
Decided October 8,1981

Appeal from decision of the Montana
State Office, Bureau of Land Manage**
ment, rejecting simultaneous noncom
petitive oil and gas lease application
M 49009.
Affirmed.
1. Oil and Oas Leases: Applications:
Generally—Oil and Gas Leases: Appli
cations: Attorneys-in-Fact or Agents
An oil and gas lease application. Form
3112-1 (June 19S0), Is not completed
in accordance w ith regulation 43 CFR
3112.2-1 or the instructions on the appli
cation itself where questions (d) through
(f) are not answered by checking appro
priate boxes in the application as the in
structions require.

2.
Administrative
Authority:
Laches—Estoppel—Laches
The authority of the United States to
enforce a public right or protect a public
interest is not vitiated or lost through
lack of enforcement by some of its
officers.

APPEARANCES: Bruce A. Budner,
Esq., Dallas, Texas, for appellant.
OPINION B Y CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
PARRETTE
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Clyde K. Kobbeman filed a simul
taneous noncompetitive oil and gas
lease application for parcel M T 1 in
the September 1980 drawing in the
Montana State Office, Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). This
application was drawn with first
priority and assigned serial number
M 49009.
On Apr. 30, 1981, BLM issued a
decision rejecting Kobbeman’s ap
plication because questions (d),
( e ) , and ( f ) 1 were not completed on
the back of the application by check
ing appropriate boxes, which vio
lates 43 CFR 3112.2-1 (a) (1980).
Kobbeman appealed this decision.
[1]
We agree that appellant’s ap
plication was not completed and
that BLM therefore properly re
jected i t A simultaneous noncom
petitive oil and gas lease application
must be completed (43 CFR 3112.21(a)) or it must be reiected as an
improper filing. 43 CFR 3112.61 The portion of the application in question
is as follows:
“UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIES AS FOL
LOWS (check appropriate boxes) [emphasis
in original] :

•

•

#

•

•

“ (d) Does any party, other than the appli
cant and those identified herein as other par
ties in interest, own or hold any interest in
this application, or the offer or lease which
may result? Yes Q No Q
“ (e) Does any agreement, understanding, or
arrangement exist which requires the under
signed to assign, or by which the undersigned
has assigned or agreed to assign, any interest
in this application, or the offer or lease which
may result, to anyone other than those identi
fied herein as other parties In Interest?
Yes □ No D
“ (f) Does the undersigned hare any interest
in any other application filed for the same par
cel as this application? Yes □ No Q ”

WYOMING WILDERNESS ACT

ATTACHMENT F
LAWS OF 98th CONG. —2nd SESS.

P.L. 98-550

Oct. 30

of-way ©ir ©th«f

fer caM projects @a the basis of ony
p re s e t of future wilderness eharecteristi®, wUderaeao designa
tion®, or wilderness etudie© @r evaluations of lands m the Medicine
Bow National Forest or m Natrona, Sweetwater, @r Carbon Counties
in Wyoming.
LEGAL DESCRIPTION AND WILDERNESS BOUNDARIES

Sec. 202. As soon as p&rtieable after the enactment of this Act, a
map and a legal description ©f each area described in titles D and Ell
shall fee filed with the Committee os Energy and Natural Resources
of the United State® Senate and the Gomraitte® on Interior and
Insular Affairs ©f the House of Representatives, and each such map
and description ©hail have the &ame force and effect a© if included in
this Act, except th at correction of clerical and typographical errors
in each such legal description and map may fee made. Each such
map and legal ascription ©hall fee on file and available for public
inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service, Depart
ment of Agriculture.
APPLICATION OF THE WILDERNESS ACT OF 1964

Sec. 203. Subject to valid existing rights, each wilderness area
designated by this Act ©hall be administered fey the Secretary in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Wilderness Act,
except that any reference in the provisions ©f the Wilderness Act to
the effective date ©f the Wilderness Act ©hall be deemed to be a
reference to the effective date of this Act.
TITLE ID-WILDERNESS STUDY AREAS
O

Sec. 301. (a) In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act,
the Secretary of Agriculture shall, upon revision of the initial land
management plans for the Bridger-Teton, Targhee, and Shoshone
National Forests required by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974, as amended by the National Forest
Management Act of 1976, review the following lands as to their
suitability for preservation as wilderness:
(1) certain lands in the Bridger-Teton and Targhee National
Forest© of Wyoming, which comprise approximately one hun
dred and thirty-five thousand eight hundred and forty acres, as
generally depicted on a map entitled "‘Palisades Wilderness
Study Area—Proposed”, dated September 1984, and which shall
be known as the Iralisades Wilderness Study Area;
(2) certain lands in the Bridger-Teton National Forest, which
comprise approximately thirty thousand acres, as generally
depicted m & map entitled r"Shoal Creek WDderaess Study
Area—Proposed”, dated September 1984, and which shall be
known as the Shoal Creek Wilderness Study Area; and
(3) certain lands in' the Shoshone National Forest of .Wyo
ming, which comprise approximately fourteen thousand ©even
hundred acres, as generally depicted on a map entitled “High
Lakes Wilderness Study Area—Proposed”, dated September
1984, and which shall be known as the High Lakes Wilderness
Study Area.
(b) Subsequent to such review the Secretary shall submit his
reports and findings to the President and the President shall submit
98 STAT. 2810

Oct. M
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jjji recommendations to the Congress within three years of the date
receipt of the Secretary's report
(c) Subject to valid existing rights and reasonable access to exer
cise such rights, until Congress determines otherwise, the Palisades,
High Lakes and Shoal Creek Wilderness Study Areas shall be
administered by the Secretary of Agriculture so as to maintain their
presently existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion
ua the National Wilderness Preservation System: Provided, That—
(1) with respect to oil and gas exploration and development
activities, the Palisades Wilderness Study Area shall be admin
istered under reasonable conditions to protect the environment
according to the laws and regulations generally applicable to
nonwildemess lands within the National Forest System;
(2) subject to valid existing rights, the Palisades Wilderness
Study Area as designated by this Act is hereby withdrawn from
all forms of appropriation under the mining laws;
(3) the provisions of section 308 of the Interior Department
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1984 (Public Law 98-146) or
similar provisions which may hereafter be enacted concerning
oil and gas leasing, exploration and development in further
planning or wilderness study areas shall not spply to the Pali
sades Wilderness Study Area; and
(4) within the Palisades, High Lakes and Shoal Creek Wilder
ness Study Areas, snowmobilmg shall continue to be allowed in
the same manner and degree as was occurring prior to the date
of enactment of this Act.
TITLE IV-RELEASE OF LANDS FOR MULTIPLE USE
MANAGEMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OP ROADLESS AREAS
S ec .

401. (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the Department of Agriculture has completed the second
roadless area review and evaluation program (RARE ID; and
(2) the Congress has made its own review and examination of
national forest roadless areas in Wyoming and the environmen
tal impacts associated with alternative allocations of such areas.
(b) On the basis of such review, the Congress hereby determines
and directs that—
(1) without passing on the question of the legal and factual
sufficiency of the RARE II final environmental statement
(dated January 1979) with respect to national forest lands in
States other than Wyoming, such statement shall not be subject
to judicial review with respect to National Forest System lands
in the State of Wyoming;
(2) with respect to the national forest lands in the State of
Wyoming which were reviewed by the Department of Agricul
ture in the second roadless area review and evaluation (KARE
II) and those lands referred to in subsection (d) except those
lands remaining in wilderness study upon enactment of this Act
and subject to section 301, that review and evaluation or refer
ence shall be deemed for the purposes of the initial land
management plans required for such lands by the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1976 (Public
Law 94-588) to be an adequate consideration of the suitability of
such lands for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preserva9 8 S T A T . 2811

